The recent financial crisis has led to the introduction of contingent convertible instruments (CoCos) in the capital framework for banks. Although CoCos can provide benefits, such as automatic recapitalization of troubled banks, their inherent risks raise questions about whether they increase the safety of the banking system. We show that concerns about CoCos in just a single bank can result in the decline of an entire market, with investors apparently unable to distinguish safe from risky bonds. In times of market-panic, investors tend to rely on credit ratings instead of estimating the real risks of missing coupon payments. We provide several recommendations to improve the capital requirements regime for banks.
Introduction
After the 2007-08 Great Financial Crisis, politicians and regulators were adamant to prevent banks relying on tax payers' bailouts in the future. One of the new instruments introduced in the regulatory framework to achieve this were contingent convertible bonds, better known as CoCos 2 . Banks have started to issue these instruments on a significant scale. Since the introduction of the CRR/CRD IV 3 in 2014, the CoCo-market has grown rapidly from euro 32 billion at the end of 2013 to euro 157 billion at the end of 2015 (Boermans and van Wijnbergen, 2017 ). Yet, in spite of this very rapid growth, a seemingly idiosyncratic profit warning, issued by Deutsche Bank (DB) on January 28 th 2016, followed by a statement by DB intended to reassure markets about DB's ability to continue coupon payments on CoCos on February 8 th 2016, threw the markets in turmoil. Not just DB's CoCo prices crashed but so did the entire market. If a single bank's profit warning (admittedly a large one) can throw the entire market in a downward spiral, a key question is whether these instruments really make the system safer. This particular market crash is the focus of this paper.
The defining feature of these new CoCo instruments is that they create automatic recapitalization in periods of stress, when shareholders are normally not willing to voluntarily issue new shares. CoCos are in fact subordinated debt that automatically converts into equity (or is written down) when a certain stress related trigger is breached and can therefore absorb losses on a going concern basis. CoCo-holders should thus absorb losses before taxpayers have to step-in.
CoCos can help capitalize a bank with minimal disruptions to operations so that these banks do not need capital infusions from the government. Advocates of CoCos see this instrument as a transparent, efficient and less costly resolution mechanism as it improves the equity ratio of a distressed bank at predetermined terms. Thus, a bank can take advantage of the benefits of debt financing -such as cheaper funding and tax advantages -in normal times while in bad times -when failing to honour debt obligations can trigger financial distress -CoCos convert into equity in order to mitigate default risk (Koziol and Lawrenz, 2010) .
Although CoCo instruments have obvious benefits, these instruments come with some downside as well. The most widely used argument against the use of CoCos, is that if regulators want to make banks safer, they simply have to require more equity (Admati et al., 2013) . Equity is a more reliable buffer while simultaneously reducing the debt overhang. CoCos add complexity to the financial system and put a significant burden on regulators in times of conversion, including legal risks related to conversion. Moreover, Chan and Van Wijnbergen (2014) show that CoCo-conversion may increase the probability of the bank being run on: Conversion can be seen as a negative signal about asset quality, which can result in clients pulling their money out. Besides, CoCos can also create incentives for more risk-taking; if a bank is close to CoCo conversion, the only way to stave off conversion other than by raising new capital is by making a quick profit. As there is a natural trade-off between risk and return, this short-term need leads to gambling for resurrection.
In Mean by Risk" and quoted an asset manager as saying "They are just too close to the wire" (Gleason et al, 2017) . On February 8 th DB responded by using its cash available to make CoCo coupon payments and subsequently offered to buy substantial amounts of debt in response to falling prices for DB debt securities.
Nevertheless DB CoCo prices crashed by some 10% against general CoCo indices while CDS spreads spiked and equity prices dropped by substantially more than benchmark equities did (Stevens and van Wijnbergen, 2017) .
Although problems started at Deutsche bank, the entire European CoComarket was hit hard. Since the news triggering the volatility was very DB specific, should we conclude that investors were unable to accurately assess the quality of CoCo instruments, leading to unwarranted contagion across all CoCo instruments? This was clearly not what banking supervisors had in mind when accepting the CoCo as part of (AT1) capital requirements. Since design flaws in CoCos might possibly allow problems at one bank to spread to others, regulators may have to reassess the usefulness of these instruments. 4 A preliminary warning was already issued on January 20th.
To establish whether the market is able to distinguish good quality CoCos from bad quality CoCos, we conduct the first empirical academic study with both market and confidential supervisory data and investigate whether CoCoinstruments present contagion risks. So far, very little empirical research has been done on CoCo instruments. This is partially because the CoCo-market is a relatively immature market that has only recently been established, but also because only limited data is publically available to look at the causes of CoCoprice behaviour. We complement Flannery (2014) , Avdjiev et al. (2015) , and Chan and van Wijnbergen (2014) , who like most of the literature looked at conversion triggers and write-down mechanisms but did not pay attention to coupon triggers. But these triggers are by their design the highest and thus will come into play first. Specifically we consider the highest trigger present in CoCo instruments, namely the Maximum Distributable Amount or MDA trigger covering coupon payments rather than conversion of principal. Based on both confidential supervisory data and market data, we will focus on the distance to the MDAtrigger and the effects on CoCo prices. We take into account a wide range of other factors that might influence CoCo prices and market reactions.
The set-up of this paper is straightforward. Section 2 briefly summarizes the capital requirements regime CoCos are part of and provides additional details about the nature and history of CoCos. In Section 3 we discuss related literature while Section 4 covers market developments and defines the main research questions explored in this paper. We outline the empirical methodology employed and describe the data in Section 5. Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Section 7 concludes and offers some takeaways for policy makers.
Capital requirements in financial markets

Capital requirements for banks
During the crisis, it became clear that sudden changes in asset quality and value can quickly wipe out the capital of a bank (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 2010) .
In response, the G20 leaders endorsed the Basel III framework in 2010. The endorsement represented a major step towards preventing a future banking crisis (Hannoun, 2010, Hart and Zingales, 2010) . Not only the excessive on-and off-balance sheet leverage, but also the gradual erosion of both the level and quality of the capital base were root causes of the collapse of the financial system in 2008. One of the main purposes of the Basel III framework is therefore to not just raise capital requirements but also to increase the quality of capital of banks. Capital should be of sufficient quality to absorb losses when needed.
Regulatory bank capital consists of different items for which capital instruments qualify (see Table 1 . T2 will be used in gone concern situations in order to shield depositors and senior creditors losses (BCBS, 2011) . Similar to AT1 instruments, T2 instruments can be written down or converted into equity, although at a later stage than AT1. Although both AT1 and T2 instruments are considered own funds for prudential purposes, the majority of them will be treated as liabilities for accounting purposes.
In the Basel III regulatory framework for banks capital requirements are set in terms of these three layers of capital (CET1, AT1, T2). Pillar 1 requires minimum risk weighted capital requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk. These Pillar 1 requirements consist of a total 8% capital requirement of which at minimum 4.5% has to be CET1, 6% has to be Tier 1 capital, and the remaining 2% may be filled with Tier 2 capital 6 . Using a higher quality of capital (e.g. using CET1 when AT1 or T2 is allowed, or using AT1 instead of T2 is always permitted). In the EU, this trigger (see Figure 2 ) lies on top of the combined buffer requirement (EBA, 2015) . In addition to automatic restrictions based on buffer requirements, banks also need to have sufficient reserves in order to be able to distribute dividends, variable 7
There are minimum requirements of at least 56% of CET1 and 75% Tier 1, the supervisor has the flexibility to determine the remaining part of the components (CET1, AT1, T2) of P2 based on their own assessment (EBA, 2014 , DNB, 2016 
CoCo-design
CoCos are structured with the purpose of providing additional capital to banks in times of financial stress. In order to provide this loss absorbing capacity CoCos have to be able to automatically absorb losses prior to insolvency while simultaneously preventing speculative attacks (Flannery, 2009 ).
CoCos have two main design features as can be seen in Figure 5 . First, the loss absorption mechanism and, second, the trigger that activates this mechanism (Avdjiev et al. 2013 ). We will discuss both in turn.
Source: Avdjiev et al. (2013) CoCos can absorb losses either by converting into common equity or through a principal write down. In both cases the issuing bank's equity is increased and debt is reduced. The conversion rate into equity of a CoCo can be based on the market price of the stock at the time the trigger is breached, a prespecified price (e.g. stock price at time of issuance), or a combination of both Figure 2 The main design features of CoCos (Avdjiev et al. 2013) 9 . The conversion of CoCos always takes place in full, although the principal write-down of a CoCo can be either partial or in full, as the contract specifies, but that contractually specified percentage is always applied to the entire CoCo. CoCos are always perpetual instruments in order to qualify as Additional Tier 1 capital 10 .
The second key parameter is the conversion trigger point: the point at which the loss absorption mechanism will be activated. The trigger can be activated in either a mechanical or a discretionary way. With a mechanical trigger, the loss absorption mechanism is activated when the capital of the issuing bank has fallen below a minimum risk weighted capital ratio. This is also known as a book-value or accounting trigger (Avdjiev et al., 2013) . Under European law, the minimum trigger for conversion is set at 5.125% of CET1 ratio but may be higher. The higher the conversion trigger, the more expensive it is for a bank to issue the CoCo instrument, as the trigger will be hit earlier.
Theoretically, triggers could also be based on market values. Market-value based triggers are set at a minimum ratio of the bank's stock market capitalization to its assets. Flannery (2005 Flannery ( , 2009 argues that this market-based view provides a better indicator of a bank's capital adequacy. Regulatory capital relies on accounting-based measures that are slow to respond to new information, whereas market-based indicators could provide a more forward-looking view (Flannery, 2005 (Flannery, , 2009 . However, as these market value triggers may be difficult to price and could create incentives for stock price manipulation (Avdjiev et al., 2013 , Flannery, 2014 , they are not widely used in practice. Sundaresan and Wang (2015) argue that using a stock price trigger is problematic as the stock price itself is affected by the possibility of conversion, possibly leading to multiple equilibria for the price. as they provide an increase in the equity ratio at pre-determined terms when the bank is in distress. Thus, banks can take advantage of the benefits of debt financing such as cheaper funding and possibly tax advantages during good times, while in bad times, when debt obligations impose the risk of financial distress CoCos will convert into equity in order to mitigate default risk (Koziol and Lawrenz, 2010) .
According to Calomiris and Herring (2013) , the two main reasons why prudential regulation failed to require banks to maintain sufficient capital were distorted measurement of risk and the failure to replenish the equity capital lost during the crisis. Especially in the deepest moment of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, when many banks had depleted their equity, there was no appetite for raising additional equity as extreme dilution for existing shareholders was feared. Institutions that had suffered large losses preferred to wait, hoping for market improvement (Calomiris and Herring, 2013) . Calomiris and Herring (2013) state that if banks at that time realized that they would be forced to replace lost capital in a timely fashion, they would have had a greater incentive to manage risk properly and to maintain an adequate equity level. They therefore argue that CoCos, if properly designed, can result in banks implementing strong systems of governance to measure and manage risk and to perform adequate capital planning. Furthermore, in their view, CoCos will encourage timely replacement of lost capital and encourage banks to respond to increased risk with a higher capital base. If banks are troubled but still satisfy the regulatory capital requirements, they may decide to hold out for a government bailout. CoCos are designed to reduce this moral hazard problem by automatic conversion. Furthermore, CoCos could help preventing an inaction bias of supervisors. Supervisors are subject to political pressure, which often leads them to prefer to forbear and play for time rather than getting into immediate action to require institutions to issue capital (Flannery (2014) , or Chan and van Wijnbergen (2017) ). Add to this the fact that supervisors may lack incentives to enforce the spirit of prudential rules as they might be challenged in judicial or administrative proceedings for taking any action that forces an institution to recognize losses, especially when there is hope that losses will be reversed in time (Calomiris and Herring, 2013) . Flannery (2014) argues that if contingent capital is inversely related to supervisors' ability to make sure that effective recapitalisation takes place when necessary, CoCos are useful.
More recently Hilscher and Raviv (2014) CoCos provide a cheaper alternative to CET1, while simultaneously providing similar loss absorbing capacity as shares.
Risks of CoCos
Although many have pointed out the above mentioned benefits, some major caveats have also come up. The most widely used counter argument to the use of CoCos is that if regulators want to make banks safer they should simply require them to issue more equity. Admati et al. (2013) in particular state that better equity-capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and perform better. CoCos certainly add complexity to the financial system and may therefore lead to a more opaque capital structure: a prospectus of a CoCo consists of hundreds of pages, is complex and difficult to understand. Conversion of debt to equity often lead to legal cases and very long legal proceedings that may take several years before being finalized. There has been very little experience with conversion of CoCos to date but it is likely that conversion of CoCos will run into similar legal quagmires. Finally, CoCos may put a high burden on regulators in times of conversion (Chan and van Wijnbergen (2017) ).
Moreover, Chan and Van Wijnbergen (2014) argue that conversion can be seen as a negative signal about asset quality, which can result in clients pulling their money away; if that happens, conversion will actually raise the probability of the converting bank being run. They argue that conversion of CoCos involves wealth transfers between creditors junior to depositors and equity holders who are anyhow always last in line in case of resolution and therefore will not add more comfort towards depositor holders. In addition, they point out that conversion of CoCo-instruments imposes a negative externality on other banks in the system in the likely case of correlated asset returns and may so contribute to systemic risk. This argument echoes earlier research of Kozial and Lawrenz CoCos lead to even stronger risk taking incentives for bank managers than straight debt.
Given the above-mentioned risks about CoCos, supervisory effectiveness may be hampered. Although mentioned as one of the potential benefits of CoCos, supervisors may actually be even more reluctant to use discretion to convert CoCos as conversion could increase systemic risk (Chan and van Wijnbergen, 2017) . Supervisors do also have to take into account, that banks operating close to conversion rates of CoCos may increase risk taking. Similar actions can also be expected for banks acting close to the MDA trigger as banks will try to avoid any negative signals to the market about their profitability.
Moreover, CoCos will never prevent failure altogether. Banks can also make other commitments such as accepting deposits and issuing short-term debt.
After a CoCo converts into equity the value of a bank's other commitments might still exceed the value of its assets and thus the bank may require additional complementary resolution measures. CoCo conversion is not necessarily sufficient to prevent bankruptcy (Squam Lake Working Group, 2009).
A last main concern is identified by Prescott (2012) who argues that triggers do not always work efficiently and that thus the market has difficulty in pricing CoCos.
CoCo markets, investors and rating agencies
The absence of a complete and informative set of credit ratings for CoCos has been a major obstacle for further growth in this market. A lack of ratings, for instance, prevents certain investors -such as pension funds -from investing in these instruments. Many rating agencies face difficulties in rating CoCos. Credit rating agencies are concerned that holders of CoCos will incur losses ahead of shareholders, especially when CoCo conversion/write down triggers are set at a high level (i.e., a trigger above 7.125%). This, in combination with the fact that supervisors have the discretion of triggering CoCos on grounds that are usually left opaque in the IPO documents (when a -usually undefined -Point of NonViability is approached), makes rating agencies such as S&P take a conservative stance in assigning ratings. Based on the recent methodology of S&P (S&P, 2014), a CoCo rating is at least two notches below the issuer's own credit rating.
For example, if a bank has an "A" rating, the bank's maximum CoCo rating can only be "BBB+" This standard downgrading can be at least partially attributed to the uncertainty the market faces with regard to valuing CoCos, including potential uncertainty about coupon payments. Ultimately such downgrading limits the appeal of this asset class since many institutional investors require a certain minimum rating (e.g. investment grade).
An additional difficulty in pricing CoCos that ratings agencies and investors have to deal with is the divergent legislation across jurisdictions with regard to the coupon related trigger. Although the Basel III rules should ultimately result in convergence of banking rules, the current calculation of the MDA-trigger, the trigger point when banks are automatically subject to restrictions on coupon payments, varies significantly between countries , banks have no incentive to hold on to this particular asset class.
Market developments and main research questions
For shareholders and investors in AT1 instruments it is obviously important to know when breaches will lead to (automatic) restrictions on dividends and coupon payments. Such uncertainty in the market can have important crossmarket price effects (Connolly et al., 2005) and is therefore not conducive to financial stability. At the time of our event, there were two key issues with regard to P2 capital requirements. First, P2 requirements were not published, To test whether the price series shown in Figure 3 indeed 
Research questions
Why did the prices of CoCos issued by banks that did not face any unexpected financial difficulties also collapse after DB's CoCo prices crashed after DB's profit warning? After all, the main risk that coupon payments might be cancelled is only likely to happen once a bank is operating close to the MDA trigger The larger the distance to the MDA trigger, the less likely coupon restrictions will apply, even if temporary losses force a bank to eat into their capital base.
However, trying to assess MDA levels brings two problems to the fore.
First of all, even if the Pillar 2 capital requirements would have been known, the stacking order of the various requirements was not. After the December 2015 publication of the EBA opinion on the stacking order, at least one source of ambiguity was resolved. So the first question we address is whether that widely publicized letter had any noticeable price impact: investors might have gotten more aware of potential restrictions on coupon payments and the moment these restrictions apply. If there was relevant ambiguity, we would expect a price impact once that ambiguity is removed. 
Research Methodology
In this section we describe the research model, the data and the specification of the equations to be estimated.
Research Model
In assessing the actual probability that automatic restrictions on coupon payments will materialize, the most relevant indicator is the distance to the MDA-trigger. The more capital a bank is holding, the less likely it is that a bank will breach the capital requirements of the combined buffer requirement, activating the automatic trigger. The analyses will therefore first look at whether the market is able to distinguish between CoCos that operate close to the trigger and CoCos that are less likely to be automatically triggered.
Note that until end 2016 the distance to the MDA-trigger was unobservable for market participants. The amount of capital a bank holds is public, but the height of the MDA-trigger is not. However, past research suggest that at least in the US where a CAMELS rating method 19 is applied by the supervisor, market investors can distill some of this information. (Hirschhorn, 1987) . As the Pillar 2 SREP analyses are very similar to the US CAMELS rating method, EU market players might also be aware of this information. Collecting the information might however be costly and time-consuming.
So, although the actual distance to the MDA trigger is most relevant, the market might use other, easier to observe metrics to determine the quality of a
CoCo that are correlated to the (distance to) the MDA trigger. As previous research from O 'Keefe and Dahl (1996) and Hirtle and Lopez (1999) state, supervisory information might lose its value quickest when a bank faces financial difficulties. As a robustness check, we will therefore also investigate whether investors use ratings as a proxy measure for the distance to the MDA-trigger in order to estimate CoCo risk. Past research by Grier and Katz (1976) and Hand and Wolthausen (1992) shows that there is a relationship between bond ratings and bond price reactions. This study will therefore also look at whether CoCos with a higher rating responded differently to the collapse of the CoCo market than CoCos with a lower rating.
Data
To ensure that the banks in our sample all face similar capital requirements and are subject to similar supervision, we limit our scope to CoCo instruments in the EU Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM 
Variables used in the analysis
Our empirical approach is a straightforward event study. As the dependent variable we take the decline in the CoCo price around the Deutsche event, using different windows to distinguish short-term and long-term effects. We include several sensitivity tests; for instance, we first investigate whether it was actually the EBA-opinion that triggered the change in market sentiment.
The market price of CoCos is measured in relation to their face value (i.e., 100 means the CoCo price pCoCo equals the face value of the CoCo). The explained variable is the average rate of change in the CoCo price measured over the window used: dpCoCo. Our main explanatory variable, dMDA, is the difference between the actual amount of Risk Weighted Capital the bank has and the height of the MDA trigger (Pillar 1 + Pillar 2 + CBR). Recall that the amount of Pillar 2 capital is information that is not publicly available, although some banks provide this information in their investors relations presentations.
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For UBS Luxembourg, a subsidiary with nine issues, Barclays PLC France (eight issues), and Danske Bank (two issues), the capital requirements for Pillar 2 are not available. We therefore exclude these banks from our analysis of the relevance of the distance to MDA trigger. 22 Common Reporting Framework (COREP) is the standardized reporting framework issued by the EBA for the Capital Requirements Directive reporting. It covers credit risk, market risk, operational risk, own fund and capital adequacy ratios. 23 Financial reporting (FINREP) is similar to COREP but based on annual report and supervisory figures of the regulatory scope of consolidation.
The Fitch and (rescaled) Moody's ratings have been transformed to a numerical scale, mapping the highest rating "AAA" to the number 24 and the lowest "D" to 1.
In addition, we include a comprehensive set of control variables. For instance, we include firm size as larger firms might provide more relevant information. One would also expect that more information is available about the activities of larger firms and that more individuals process and disseminate this information to a broader group of market agents (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992) .
Moreover, Fama and French (1993) negatively to the Deutsche Bank distress event than banks with lower leverage ratios. Lev (1974) also notes that highly leveraged firms tend to exhibit greater stock return variance. We therefore included the leverage ratio as a control variable.
A third control variable is the cost-to-income-ratio (CTI) of banks. This ratio is calculated by dividing the operating costs by operating income of banks.
Pasiours and Kosmidou (2007) suggest that the cost-to-income-ratio shows the costs of running a bank and has a negative relationship with bank performance.
Banks which are performing badly are likely to eat into their capital base and are less likely to be able to pay-out coupons. 24 The capital measure for the leverage ratio is the Tier 1 capital of the risk-based capital framework as defined in paragraphs 49 to 96 of the Basel III framework, taking account of the transitional arrangements. 25 The exposure measure for the leverage ratio should generally follow the accounting value, subject to the following: on-balance sheet, non-derivative exposures are included in the exposure measure net of specific provisions or accounting valuation adjustments (e.g., accounting credit valuation adjustments) and netting of loans and deposits is not allowed.
In order to control for region-specific effects, a fourth control variable distinguishes between banks from the South and the North of Europe 26 (Region).
This dummy is suggested by Black et al. (2016) A fifth control variable is the Return on Assets (ROA). Flannery (2005 Flannery ( , 2009 ) argues that CoCos can be an effective mechanism to exert market discipline as shareholders will have to bear the full cost of their risk taking decisions rather than relying on government bail-outs. However, CoCos can also create incentives for more risk-taking. If a bank is close to CoCo conversion, the only way to increase equity is by either raising new capital, which is difficult in the short run, or by making additional profits in a very short-time period. Gorton and Rosen (1995) , for instance, argue that in an unhealthy banking industry entrenched managers are likely to take excessive risk. As there is a natural trade-off between risk and reward, this short-term need for quick profits may result in additional risk-taking. On the one hand a higher Return on Assets could be positive for CoCo holders as this will likely result in more profits (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) and hence a lower chance of breaching the MDA trigger. On the other hand, however, a higher ROA might be an indicator of high risk taking with only upward potential for shareholders (as they can obtain more dividends) risking the fixed coupon payments of CoCo-holders.
The sixth and last control variable is the coverage ratio (Covr)). The coverage ratio is the percentage of specific allowances for non-performing loans over the amount of non-performing loans. The higher the coverage ratio, the more provisions the bank has had to take to cover for non-performing loans.
Note that during our estimation period, the new IFRS9 rules on provisioning against prospective losses were not implemented yet, and provisions could thus only be recognized if loans were actually overdue (90 days or more: "occurred losses"). One interpretation of this variable could be that fewer future losses can be expected for a bank with higher coverage ratios since most of the bad news has already been processed by the market. This can be positive for CoCo-holders as provisions that decrease retained earnings have already been taken and that no additional losses which could result in a breach of the MDA trigger are expected. Note that an alternative causation could be that high provisioning is a sign of bad news still to come.
Taking all this together yields our Equation ( 
Empirical analysis
We first present an overview of the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analyses (Table 1) . The distance to the MDA trigger was on average 3.66% of risk weighted capital. This means that banks had a capital ratio that was on average 3.66 percentage points (366 basis points) above the required capital ratio at which coupons would be automatically restricted. Note that the standard deviation is high, almost as large as the mean value.
The average CoCo rating in the sample is 14.22, which is between BB+ and BBB-. The ROA was on average 0.35%, slightly above the average of the largest 154 European banks as published by the EBA
28
. The leverage ratio is on average 4.81%, well above the minimum 3% requirement. Note that in line with what is customary in banking regulation, we define the leverage ratio as equity over assets, so banks with a higher ratio are less risky. The cost-to-income ratio in the dataset is on average 54.78%, which is below the EU average of around 60%. The average of total assets is around 521 billion euro. Finally the coverage ratio is on average 44.1% similar to the 43.8% in the EBA banking risk dashboard 28 . Table 1 below shows the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. The majority of correlations are far below 0.8, with the exception of the correlation 27 The coverage of the explanatory variables differs and we thus cannot exclude the possibility that differential data availability might have an impact on our results. 28 EU Banking risk dashboard: https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-updated-risk-dashboard-shows-eu-bankshave-further-increased-their-capital-ratios-in-q4-2015.
between the coverage ratio and the CTI (cost ratio) which equals 0.77. The matrix suggests there is no multicollinearity problem. 
Regression results
The first event we investigate is the release of the EBA opinion on 16 th December 2015. The intent of releasing this opinion was to reduce uncertainty in the market regarding the height of the MDA trigger by publishing the rules governing the stacking order of the various capital components. As such we would expect some market reaction. But Figure 3 already suggests that the distribution of CoCo prices did not show any appreciable movement over any window centered around the date of the EBA letter. This can indicate that the market already knew the position of the MDA trigger before the publication date, that the market needed time to absorb the new information, or that it did not materially reduce the uncertainty. After all knowing the stacking order does not help much since the required P2 buffers were still unknown. To investigate whether this hides cross-sectional movement within the distribution, we regress Equations 1 through 3, shown in Table 2 . We use 1 week, 2 week and 1 month windows. We do not extend the window size beyond one month on each side so as to avoid overlap with the subsequent Deutsche Bank event. We do not find very strong effects of the EBA letter at a 5% level or lower except for one of the three specifications within the 1 month window. To the extent that a downward shift occurred it was bigger in the South and smaller for banks with a high ROA (Equation 7)). The distance to the MDA trigger only shows up significantly in equation (8) but the variable becomes insignificant if the Ratings variable is included also. In the short run (i.e., the 1 week window, columns 1-3), we see that bond prices of banks with lower leverage (higher leverage ratio), increase somewhat. Prices of more profitable banks, drop a little.
Possibly there is a risk-return trade off at play here. In the longer run, we see that the leverage ratio and the return on assets effects are reversed. Overall the conclusion seems to be that the EBA letter clarifying the stacking order of the various capital components did not have a significant impact on market prices.
Regression results around Deutsche Bank event
Next we turn to an investigation of the Deutsche Bank event on February 8, 2016. As discussed in the previous section, this date seems to be a good choice for a common break date. We again show the same set of three Equations for three time windows. In contrast to the EBA regressions, we are not constrained by subsequent events and hence can use wider windows for the longer horizons.
The models explain a significant portion of the variation (with adjusted R 2 of between almost 30% and 70%). The larger the window, the higher the explained variation. Now we do find a significant downward shift in all equations except the ones where the Ratings variable is omitted, so we confirm the time series evidence of a significant market wide downward shift after the DB announcement. And the downward shift is larger going from a one week window to a two week window but does not seem to increase further: the constant terms in the two week regressions is not significantly different from the term estimated in the 3 months window regressions. Apparently the impact stabilized after about two weeks.
A key finding is that the distance to the MDA-trigger is not significantly related to the change in CoCo-prices for any of the windows. This strongly indicates that the market is not able to distinguish between CoCos that operate close to the MDA-trigger and those that are safer with regard to coupon payments. And although the distance to the MDA trigger is not significant, the ratings are:
regardless of the chosen window, the market seems to rely heavily on public ratings in pricing CoCos with highly rated CoCos decreasing less in price around the event date.
As for the other control variables: these are all as one would expect. Total assets are negatively related with the change in price. One potential explanation might be that larger banks are more in the spotlight, were seen as a safe haven and that investors therefore are less forgiving if a large bank such as for instance Deutsche Bank encounters problems in paying coupons.
In addition, for all windows, CoCos of banks with a higher ROA show larger negative price reactions. This may seem puzzling at first sight but could indicate that a higher ROA is seen as an indicator of more risk taking; with upward potential for shareholders but putting the fixed coupon payments of CoCoholders at risk. Gorton and Rosen (1995) , for instance, argue that in an unhealthy banking industry managers can be expected to take on excessive risk.
The cost-to-income ratio is also negatively related to the dependent variable, meaning that a one standard deviation higher cost to income ratio of the bank led to a 2 percentage point larger drop in a CoCo-prices. These findings are in line with the research of Pasiours and Kosmidou (2007), who argue that the cost-to-income ratio is an accurate measure of the costs of running a bank and hence has a negative relationship with bank performance. Bad performers are likely to eat-into their capital base and are less likely to be able to pay-out coupons which will have a negative impact on CoCo-prices.
Over the longer horizon, the coverage ratio is significantly positive. The higher the coverage ratio, the more provisions have already been taken in order to cover for the non-performing loans. Arguably this is a positive sign for CoCoholders as retained earnings reducing provisions have already been taken and thus fewer additional losses, which could result in a breach of the MDA trigger, are to be expected. 
Conclusions
We use the recent turmoil after a profit warning at Deutsche Bank (DB) to assess whether markets can adequately price in the riskiness of Cocos: can the market handle these relatively new hybrid debt instruments? After a profit warning late January 2016 and a clarification, or at least a press release intended as such, issued by DB February 8, DB CoCo prices crashed; but so did the entire CoCo market, although to a somewhat lesser extent. Based on a unique dataset we are the first academic study that has shown with market evidence from around the dates the DB episode played itself out that the market is not able to distinguish between the riskiness of different CoCos. Moreover, while the academic literature has focused exclusively on conversion triggers, we are also the first to focus on the higher trigger embedded in CoCos: the MDA trigger. MDA stands for the Maximum Distributable Amount and the distance to this trigger indicates the likelihood that coupon payments are at risk.
The problems at Deutsche Bank resulted in an average decrease of CoCo prices of 4.79 cents to the euro for the entire EU CoCo market; the entire market thus reacted instantaneously to problems at one single bank. Of course this could reflect that the banks all had highly correlated assets, but this is a very unlikely explanation given the diversity of the banks included in our sample.
An alternative explanation could be widely spread cross-holdings of banks of each other's CoCos, but this we know not to be the case (cf Hüser et al. (2017) and Boermans and van Wijnbergen (2017) ). This is not surprising as the Basel 3 regulation highly discourages banks to purchase each other's CoCo-instruments, such investments effectively carry a 100% capital requirement.
So why did investors sell off their investments in CoCo-instruments at different banks after a profit warning issued by just one bank? A more likely explanation is that market participants realized that CoCos might be riskier than previously assumed, and in particular that they previously underestimated the likelihood of coupon payout restrictions starting to bite. The apparent vulnerability of these relatively new instruments to waves of panic is more likely related to the opaqueness still surrounding key trigger mechanisms embedded in them, and that has therefore been the focus of this paper.
An EBA-opinion issued about a month before the DB scare started attempted to shed more light on the regulatory rules CoCos are subject to. In particular the EBA clarified the stacking order in which various capital components needed to be applied to assess the distance to the trigger on coupon payments. But this information was apparently not enough to significantly affect differential CoCo prices: we show in this paper that the EBA publication did not meet with any significant price response. After the EBA publication, investors were still not able to distinguish between CoCos that were operating further away or closer to the MDA-trigger when problems occurred at Deutsche Bank. This means that the market itself was not able to distinguish
CoCos that were safer with regard to coupon payments than CoCos that were not. Hence we focus on the remaining source of uncertainty: critical capital components (the P2 buffers) were until very recently not published, so markets could still not adequately assess the distance to MDA triggers.
We show, using confidential data on the distance to MDA triggers, that the price response to the DB turmoil was unrelated to the issuing bank's actual distance to its MDA trigger. Instead the market seemed to have relied on prior ratings that were assigned to these instruments. CoCos with higher ratings reacted with a lower decrease in price around the problems of Deutsche Bank than CoCos with a lower rating. As the track record of credit ratings during the last banking crisis was not that promising (Partnoy, 2009 ) supervisors might consider this fact as worrying. In the past years, banking regulation has limited the use of credit ratings in the credit risk framework. Nevertheless, the market still seems to assign significant importance to the opinion of rating agencies for lack of any better information.
A logical question then is whether ratings are a good predictor of the quality of CoCos. Not in this case: we also show that there was a very low correlation between the relevant ratings and the issuing banks' distance to the MDA trigger relevant information for investors in order to be able to properly judge the risks present in CoCos, market authorities will force banks to disclose the capital requirements that are MDA relevant. Due to this change in disclosure requirements, it would be interesting to verify whether markets are now better able to respond better to changes in the capital base versus the requirements.
Future research could verify whether disclosure of capital requirements has an impact on CoCo-prices, and whether the fact that their value is now in the public domain makes market prices better reflect the risks embedded in these instruments. On the one hand, more transparency could indeed result in prices better reflecting risks in CoCos. On the other hand, the market could have done similar calculations in the past as well, by making an average estimation of Pillar 2 requirements, which do not differ that materially across big banks that issue
CoCos.
Open questions for Policy makers
The outcomes of our research suggests that policy makers should closely monitor whether the market is able to better absorb available information about
CoCos now that the MDA triggers are disclosed as of 2017. One question will be whether improving the information environment for CoCos has reduced spurious volatility and in particular will lead to less widespread and more discriminating market responses to new events. In addition policy makers should further investigate the trade-off between a low MDA trigger, which will possibly result in fewer negative market events with CoCos and a higher MDA trigger which would prevent banks in trouble to continue distributions as a way of signaling market strength but thereby decreasing their capital base. Acharya et al. (2016) show that the worst performing banks during the most recent stress tests, have distributed most dividends. Lowering the MDA-trigger, which mainly helps poorly performing banks, can help them to continue to pay-out coupons, whereas strengthening their capital base might be a better alternative.
Another issue of policy relevance is the role of CoCos in the regulatory framework. CoCos can now be used to meet Pillar 1 requirements and depending on the supervisor, also Pillar 2. If CoCos create more market turbulence than CET 1 capital, and the loss absorption benefits of CoCos do not fully outweigh the disadvantages, policy makers might need to consider a more limited role for CoCos in the regulatory framework. Another issue needing more scrutiny is the design of the MDA trigger. Should the MDA trigger design, as it is now, remain the same for dividends and bonuses as for coupon payments? Especially when the MDA trigger will be connected to the MREL/TLAC requirements, a different design for coupons, dividends and bonuses may be worth further investigating as this trigger is likely to be hit more frequently.
We think that the research reported on in this paper and the additional work waiting to be done is highly relevant for policy makers and market participants considering the issue and structure of new CoCos. Price discovery is one of the key functions of financial market, and we have demonstrated in this paper that the opaqueness surrounding the MDA trigger for Cocos is undermining that price discovery function, leading to information contagion triggering sudden panics and crashes that do not always seem to be in line with underlying fundamentals.
Appendix
Glossary AT1: Additional Tier 1 instruments. Contingent Convertibles or CoCos. Instruments that may be written down or converted when certain triggers are hit.
Combined Buffer Requirement (CBR) total of the buffer requirements applicable to bank. Consists of Capital Conservation Buffer, Counter Cyclical buffer and the Systemic Risk buffer.
MDA trigger: Maximum distributable amount trigger. The point at which banks will have to deal with automatic restrictions on coupons, bonuses and dividends.
MREL: Minimum requirement for own fund and eligible liabilities. Additional capital requirements for resolution purposes, which can be met with a lower qualify of capital (e.g. Tier 3).
Pillar 1 requirements Standard risk weighted capital requirements of banks (8%)
Pillar 2 requirements Idiosyncratic capital requirements based on risks not sufficiently covered under P1.
Stacking Order: The way in which capital requirements are stapled. E.g. P1+P2+CBR.
Comparing AT1 and T2 Instruments 
